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ABSTRACT 
Learning and Self-Confidence in Contests 
by Daniel Krähmer * 
The paper studies a repeated contest when contestants are uncertain about 
their true abilities. A favourable belief about one's own ability (confidence) 
stimulates effort and increases the likelihood of success. Success, in turn, 
reinforces favourable beliefs. We consider a specific example in which this 
reinforcement mechanism implies that, with positive probability, players fail to 
learn their true abilities, and one player may eventually win the contest forever. 
As a consequence, persistent inequality arises, and the worse player may 
eventually prevail. Furthermore, confidence is self-serving in that it increases a 
player's utility and the likelihood to be the long-run winner. 
 
Keywords: Contest, self-confidence, belief reinforcement, incomplete learning, 
 dynamic programming 
JEL Classification: C37, C61, D44, D83 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Lernen und Selbstvertrauen in Wettkämpfen 
Das Papier betrachtet einen wiederholten Wettkampf, in dem die Wettkämpfer 
ihre wahren Fähigkeiten nicht kennen. Wettkämpfer mit einer hohen Einschät-
zung ihrer eigenen Fähigkeiten (Selbstvertrauen) zeigen eine höhere Einsatz-
bereitschaft und haben damit bessere Erfolgsaussichten. Umgekehrt verstärken 
Erfolge das Selbstvertrauen. Wir betrachten ein einfaches Beispiel, in dem 
dieser sich selbst verstärkende Effekt dazu führt, dass die Spieler mit positiver 
Wahrscheinlichkeit über ihre wahren Fähigkeiten im Ungewissen bleiben, und 
dass ein Spieler schließlich für immer als Sieger aus dem Wettkampf hervor-
geht. Als Folge ergeben sich dauerhafte Ungleichheiten, wobei es der tatsäch-
lich unfähigere Spieler sein kann, der langfristig überlegen ist. Darüber hinaus 
zeigt sich, dass Selbstvertrauen sowohl den Nutzen eines Spielers als auch die 
Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeit, der schließlich überlegene Spieler zu sein, erhöht. 
 
                                                 
*  I would like to thank Helmut Bester, Jürgen Bierbaum, Paul Heidhues, Kai Konrad, and 
Roland Strausz for helpful comments and discussions. 
 
 
 
1 Introduction
Consider a contest in which the probability of success is determined by a players ability, eﬀort,
and luck. If ability and eﬀort are complements, highly able players will exert more eﬀort than
less able ones. When ability is unknown, then eﬀort is chosen according to perceived rather
than to true ability: players who regard themselves as highly able will exert more eﬀort than
more pessimistic ones. Higher eﬀort increases the probability of success for an optimistic player,
and more successes, being indicative of high ability, will, in turn, reinforce an optimistic players
optimistic belief. At the same time as the winner becomes more optimistic, the loser becomes
more pessimistic. This suggests that in a contest with unknown abilities beliefs tend to diverge,
accompanied by long winning streaks for one player.
The paper illustrates this basic reinforcement mechanism by means of a simple example
and explores its consequences for the long run. We show that belief reinforcement implies
that, with positive probability, players fail to learn their true abilities in equilibrium, and that
persistent inequality will arise in the long run in the sense that one player will eventually win
the contest forever, whereas the other player will eventually be discouraged and reduce eﬀort
to a minimum. This is true irrespective of objective abilities. Therefore, the objectively better
player may be discouraged, and at the same time, the objectively worse player may entertain
a mistakenly favourable self-belief.
Besides complementarity of ability and eﬀort, the driving force of these results is that we
assume that the importance of ability declines if one player reduces eﬀort. Only if both players
invest suﬃcient eﬀort, ability makes the diﬀerence. This reßects a particular form of strategic
interaction in our contest: for example, if a player is the only one to apply for a job, he gets
the job with certainty, irrespective of his ability.
Declining importance of ability implies that the contest outcome becomes uninformative if a
player suﬃciently reduces eﬀort. At such a point, updating will stop, the optimistic player easily
wins, and inequality becomes persistent. That such a point may be reached, is a result of belief
reinforcement which will eventually drive beliefs suﬃciently apart such that the discouraged
player will reduce eﬀort to an uninformative minimum.
Beliefs in our model may be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, initial beliefs,
i.e., priors, may represent the objective distribution from which nature draws actual ability.
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A player with a higher belief then not only regards himself to be better than a player with a
lower belief, but he is indeed objectively better (on average). On the other hand, beliefs may
be seen as a players internal, or subjective representation of the world which, in principle, may
initially be entirely disconnected from external, or objective reality.1 Seen as such, beliefs are a
characteristic of a player and may be interpreted as self-conÞdence. The material consequences
of (purely mental) self-conÞdence can then be studied by comparative statics with respect to
beliefs. However, it is important to note that comparative statics is only meaningful for a given
Þxed realization of intrinsic abilities, i.e., ex post.2
With this second interpretation, we can study the impact of (initial) self-conÞdence on a
players performance. As a consequence of complementarity, higher self-conÞdence increases the
probability to be the eventually prevailing player. In this sense, conÞdence is self-serving. Long
term success may not necessarily be the result of ability but rather of conÞdence in combination
with an initial streak of good luck.
The latter is consistent with evidence from social psychology suggesting that positive illu-
sions promote motivation and persistence and thereby increase the likelihood to succeed in a
given task (Taylor/Brown (1988), Colvin/Block (1994)). Conversely, there is evidence that in-
dividuals with low self-esteem exert less eﬀort as a result of not expecting to succeed, triggering
the self-fulÞlling prophecy described above (Brockner (1984)).
As for contests, in a recent economic experiment Gneezy et al. (2001) Þnd that womens
absolute performance tends to be worse than mens in mixed- but not in single-gender tour-
naments. They also Þnd that men are typically more conÞdent than women. In line with our
results, they argue that the diﬀerence in the two treatments might be due to a conÞdence eﬀect.
That conÞdence is self-serving in contests, is also consistent with anecdotal statements of top
athletes that suggest that what makes the diﬀerence in top competition is not primarily ability
but rather mental strength.
In a very stylized way, our model may also be relevant for other domains, particularly
labour markets. Labour market successgetting accepted to a good university, getting a job,
1See Van den Steen (2002) for an elaboration of that view.
2To study the material consequences as objectively expected ex ante, one has to evaluate each possible ability
scenario by some given objective distribution which is known only to some ideal outside observer but completely
unknown to the players of the game. In what follows, all results are such that they hold for every possible ability
scenario. Therefore, we do not need to distinguish between subjective and objective distribution.
2
or getting promotedis often determined by relative performance, i.e., contests.
For example, our results are in line with research that suggests that long-term unemployment
might, to a large extent, be the result of discouragement and loss of self-esteem and not only
of missing intrinsic ability (Darity/Goldsmith (1996), Dunifon/Duncan (1998)).
Our model may also contribute to the discussion on intergenerational mobility in labour mar-
kets. Seen as an intergenerational model, it predicts a strong correlation between the labour
market success of parents and of their children. This is consistent with substantial empirical
evidence that parental earnings are a reliable predictor for childrens earnings (see Solon (1999)
for a review). Yet, what appears to be puzzling is that the labour market success of success-
ful parents children cannot be accounted for by their superior education, or the inheritance
of wealth, or cognitive ability (Bowles et al. (2001). Our model suggests that conÞdence, or
self-esteem transmitted to children by parental upbringing may possibly be one of the missing
elements in explaining the intergenerational stability of labour market outcomes.
Literature
Several studies look at the impact of beliefs on economic performance, but their focus is mostly
diﬀerent from ours. Our notion of conÞdence is similar to the one in Benabou/Tirole (2002a,
2002b), who examine the incentives to manipulate information concerning the self. For instance,
by delegating tasks, a principal may foster an agents conÞdence and thereby stimulate eﬀort.
There is evidence that overconÞdence and optimism is prominent among CEOs and entrepre-
neurs which may give rise to distorted investment decisions (see Malmendier/Tate (2002) for an
empirical paper, and Manove/Padilla (1999), de Meza/Southey (1996) for theoretical papers).
ConÞdence-dependent performance may also explain attribution biases and judgement errors
(Compte/Postlewaite (2001)).
As for learning, two recent studies show how misperceptions in form of overconÞdence and
optimism may survive in the long run. Heifetz/Spiegel (2000) consider a class of stage games
that includes contests, but in contrast to us, they consider an evolutionary dynamics and
formalize optimism as biased perceptions of the game rather than as beliefs. Optimism may
also survive in a perfect competition environment (Manove (2000)).
Our no-learning result bears some similarity to no-learning results in bandit problems (Roth-
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schild (1974), Berry/Fristedt (1985)).3 In fact, in our model, a players problem can be viewed
as a two-armed bandit problem where an arms payoﬀ characteristic depends directly on which
arm the other player chooses. We are not aware of any paper that has considered a bandit
problem of that type.4
Finally, in the contest literature, only few papers consider players who do not know their own
abilities. One example is Rosen (1986) who studies the optimal design of prizes in an elimination
tournament. In an elimination tournament however, the reinforcement mechanism we study
does not obtain because after each period winners are matched with similarily conÞdent winners.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 illustrates the
basic belief reinforcement mechanism. Section 4 analyses an inÞnite horizon model. To pro-
vide intuition, section 4.1 considers the case with myopic players. Section 4.2 deals with the
dynamcally optimizing players. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Time t = 0, 1, 2, ..., t is discrete and may be Þnite or inÞnite. In each period, there are two
players, i = 1, 2, who engage in a contest. The winner prize is normalized to 1 and the loser
prize to 0. The winning probability in period t is determined by players types (ability) and
eﬀorts spent.
Players types are unknown, also to players themselves. Let αi be player is type, where
αi ∈ {αL,αH} ,αL < αH , and denote by γti player is belief in period t to be of type αH .
We assume that there is no asymmetric information, that is, beliefs are common knowledge.
γi is referred to as player is conÞdence. Let γ = (γ1, γ2), and deÞne ∆γ = γ1 − γ2, and
∆α = αH − αL.
Eﬀorts ei are in some (ordered) set D, and the cost of spending eﬀort e is c (e). D and c
are speciÞed in the sections below.
The true winning probability for player i in a given period for given eﬀorts and given types is
denoted by pi (ei, e−i;α), and pi is increasing in ei and αi and decreasing in e−i and α−i. Since
3For an interesting interpretation of a bandit problem as a self-conÞdence model see Bar-Isaac (2000).
4In the literature on multi-armed bandit games, an arms payoﬀ depends on what other players do
(Bolton/Harris (1999), Keller/Rady (2002)). But in these approaches, a players payoﬀ is not aﬀected directly
by other players choices but by the possibility to observe their payoﬀs.
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true abilities are unknown, players have to form expectations about their winning chances.
Denote by π (e1, e2; γ) player 1s expected winning probability for eﬀorts e1 and e2, given belief
γ.
Players are assumed to be Bayesian rational and to discount future proÞts by a common
discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1).
3 Belief Reinforcement in the Short Run
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the basic reinforcement mechanism when eﬀorts
and abilities are complements. We use a simple linear model with continuous eﬀort levels and
quadratic costs. That is,
pi (ei, e−i;α) =
1
2
+ αiei − α−ie−i, (1)
c (e) =
1
2
e2. (2)
To guarantee that pi is a probability, we restrict e to the interval D = [0, 1/ (2αH)].
The model is a score diﬀerence model where player is score is given by αiei plus some noise
term with the noise diﬀerence uniformly distributed.
Consider Þrst the one-shot contest (t = 1). For given e−i, the Þrst order condition for player
i yields the best reply
e∗i = αi, (3)
where αi = γi∆α + αL is the expected ability of player i. Since the best response does not
depend on the rivals eﬀort ei, (3) also describes the equilibrium. Thus, in scenario (α1,α2) the
objective winning probability for player 1 in equilibrium is
p∗1 =
1
2
+ α1α1 − α2α2 (4)
= γ1∆α · α1 − γ2∆α · α2 + αL (α1 − α2) + 1
2
. (5)
This implies the following result.
Proposition 1 For t = 1 it holds:
p∗i is increasing in own conÞdence γi and decreasing in the rivals conÞdence γ−i.
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The proposition is a direct consequence of complementarity. It says that conÞdence increases
a players winning chance. In this sense, conÞdence is self-serving. Higher conÞdence increases
the expected marginal return to eﬀort. This increases the eﬀort chosen which, in turn, raises
the objective winning chance.
A further question is whether diﬀerences in abilities can be compensated by conÞdence.
That is, whether the objectively worse player can have a higher objective winning chance if the
former is suﬃciently more conÞdent than his rival. It turns out that in a two-type environment,
this can never be the case. To see this, suppose player 1 is of type αL and has the highest
possible conÞdence α1 = αH while player 2 is of type αH and has the lowest possible conÞdence
α2 = αL. Then player 1s objective winning chance is 1/2 + αLαH − αHαL = 1/2 which is
also the objective winning chance of player 2. Thus, diﬀerences in conÞdence cannot oﬀset
diﬀerences in abilities.
Note however that this is no longer true in an environment with three types. If there is
a third, intermediate, type αM with αL < αM < αH , then in state (αL,αM) with conÞdence
(α1,α2) = (αH ,αL) the winning chance of player 1 is 1/2 + αLαH − αMαL, and that of player
2 is 1/2 + αMαL − αLαH . Hence, player 1 is more likely to win.
Suppose next that there are two time periods (t = 2). One may think of two legs in a sports
tournament or of two halfs in a match. Consider a symmetric situation with initially equally
conÞdent players, that is, γ1 = γ2. Due to symmetry, there is a symmetric perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in which both players choose the same eﬀort in period 1. This equilibrium
has the following two properties.
Proposition 2 For t = 2 and γ1 = γ2 it holds:
(i) For all scenarios (α1,α2), the likelihood of winning in period 2 increases after a Þrst period
success and decreases after a Þrst period failure.
(ii) If both players are equally able objectively, that is, α1 = α2, then one player winning twice
is more likely than each player winning once.
The proposition results fromBayesian updating together with complementarity. By Bayesian
updating, winning in period 1 is indicative of being highly able and raises conÞdence. By com-
plementarity, this increases eﬀort and thus the likelihood of winning in period 2.5 This is stated
5The eﬀort choice in period 1 has therefore two beneÞts. Besides the current winning probability, it aﬀects
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in (i). (ii) says that uneven outcomes, or inequalities are likely to obtain in the short run. With
α1 = α2 and equal eﬀorts in period 1, each players chance of winning in period 1 is 1/2. Due
to updating, the Þrst period winner increases eﬀort and the loser decreases eﬀort in period 2,
raising the winners likelihood to also win in period 2 above 1/2. The total probability of two
consecutive successes for a player is therefore larger than 1/2.
While these results illustrate the logic of our basic belief reinforcement mechanism for the
short run, the next section explores its consequencesfor the long run.
4 Long-Run Implications and Learning
We now consider an inÞnite horizon model (t = ∞). For this, we assume that eﬀorts are
discrete, that is, a player can either spend eﬀort (e = 1) or not (e = 0). The cost of spending
eﬀort is c > 0.
The winning probabilities in a given period are as follows. If exactly one player spends
eﬀort, this player will win with probability 1, irrespective of abilities. If both players spend the
same eﬀort ei = e−i, then the winning probability for player 1, conditional on types, is6
p (e1, e2;α) =
1
2
+ α1e1 − α2e2, (6)
and for player 2 it is 1− p (e1, e2;α) .
In summary, the matrix of winning probabilities of player 1 is
e2 = 1 e2 = 0
e1 = 1
1
2
+ αi − α−i 1
e1 = 0 0
1
2
.
(7)
Embodied in this contest success function are thus two crucial assumptions: Þrst, as above,
ability and eﬀort are complements. Second, if one player does not exert eﬀort, then the contest
outcome is independent of abilities. In other words, only if both players invest eﬀort, ability
makes the diﬀerence. This is the most extreme form of a contest in which the importance of
the future winning chance via its inßuence on conÞdence. Period 1 eﬀort is thus larger than period 2 eﬀort. As
for contest design, if the designer wants to induce even eﬀort across periods, the simple repeated contest may
thus be suboptimal.
6We shall now write plain p for p1.
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ability declines with declining eﬀort of one player. This property reßects a speciÞc form of
strategic interaction in our contest. For example, if a player is the only one to apply for a job,
he gets the job with certainty, irrespective of his ability.
The expected winning probability of player 1 for eﬀorts e1 and e2, given belief γ, is thus
π (e1, e2; γ) =

0 if (e1, e2) = (0, 1)
1/2 if (e1, e2) = (0, 0)
1/2 +∆γ∆α if (e1, e2) = (1, 1)
1 if (e1, e2) = (1, 0) .
(8)
We make the following parameter restrictions:
0 < 1/2− (αH − αL) < c < 1/2. (9)
The Þrst inequality says that p is indeed a probability. The second inequality says that if beliefs
are suﬃciently diﬀerent (∆γ close to +1 or −1), then, given the rival player chooses high eﬀort,
the current payoﬀ for the pessimistic player from exerting eﬀort is negative. The third inequality
says that, given the rival player exerts no eﬀort, the current payoﬀ from choosing eﬀort is higher
than from not choosing eﬀort.
4.1 Myopic Players
To build intuition, we shall Þrst consider a sequence of one-shot contests played by myopic play-
ers (δ = 0). For this, we Þrst solve for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the one-shot contest.
The one-shot game
Best Response
Let e2 = 0. Since c < 1/2, it is optimal to choose e1 = 1, irrespective of beliefs. Let e2 = 1,
then e1 = 1 is a best response for player 1 if, and only if,
1
2
+∆γ∆α− c ≥ 0. (10)
Hence, spending eﬀort e1 = 1 is a best response against e2 = 1 if, and only if, γ1 ≥ (c− 1/2) /∆α+
γ2. Let θ = (1/2− c) /∆α, and let r1 (γ2) = −θ+γ2. Then, player 1 exerts eﬀort against e2 = 1
if, and only if, his belief γ1 exceeds the threshold r1 (γ2). By (9), θ ∈ (0, 1).
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Because of symmetry, the best response of player 2 looks alike.
Equilibrium
We have the following equilibria in pure strategies:
 If ∆γ ≤ −θ, then e1 = 0, e2 = 1 is the unique equilibrium.
 If ∆γ ≥ θ, then e1 = 1, e2 = 0 is the unique equilibrium.
 If ∆γ ∈ (−θ, θ), then e1 = 1, e2 = 1 is the unique equilibrium.
Hence, if the diﬀerence in beliefs ∆γ is suﬃciently large, one player is discouraged and the
other player wins with certainty.7 A typical equilibrium looks as follows.
Evolution
Consider now a sequence of one-shot games which are linked only by Bayesian updating but
not by intertemporal utility maximization. That is, players in period t play a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the one-shot contest given beliefs γti . According to the outcome of the contest,
beliefs are updated and transmitted to players in period t + 1. Hence, the model can be
interpreted as an intergenerational game in which the successor generation inherits the updated
beliefs of the predecessor generation.
Denote by ∆γt the diﬀerence between player 1s and player 2s beliefs in period t. Notice
that once |∆γt| ≥ θ, the more conÞdent player will win with certainty in period t. Accordingly,
winning is not informative about players abilities, and beliefs stay the same. That is, |∆γt| ≥ θ
implies ∆γt+1 = ∆γt.
Let T be the Þrst period in which one player ceases to spend eﬀort, that is,
T = min {t : |∆γt| ≥ θ}. It follows from the previous paragraph that∆γt = ∆γs for all t, s ≥ T .
Accordingly, in T one player is discouraged and stops exerting eﬀort forever. This implies the
following result.
Proposition 3 For all scenarios (α1,α2), with positive probability, one player will be discour-
aged, that is,
Pr [T <∞| (α1,α2)] > 0. (11)
7As in the previous section, player is equilibrium winning chance increases in γi. Because eﬀorts are now
discrete however, it does not increase smoothly but jumps at the threshold r1 (γ2).
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Proof : Since θ < 1, it requires an at most Þnite number of consecutive successes of one
player such that Bayesian updating leads to |∆γt| ≥ θ. But this event obtains with positive
probability in all scenarios (α1,α2), that is, Pr [T <∞| (α1,α2)] > 0. ¤
As mentioned in the introduction, conÞdence, or self-esteem, passed on to children in the
course of their upbringing may play an important role in determining labour market success
and help explain the strong correlation between parents and childrens earnings. To be sure,
our model is, of course, too simple and stylized to provide a deÞnite explanation. For instance,
in reality, parents and childrens abilities are certainly not perfectly correlated which weakens
the conÞdence eﬀect. Nevertheless, our model may point into a direction of future research,
exactly because it generates inequality without appealing to factors like education, wealth, or
neighbourhood eﬀects.
4.2 Farsighted Players
Consider now two inÞnitely lived players who, in each period, engage in the contest described
above. The main diﬀerence to myopic players is that exerting eﬀort yields now not only a
return for the current period but, depending on what the rival player does, may also generate
information that can be used in the future. In other words, by exerting eﬀort a player can
experiment.
As common in repeated games, there may be many equilibria. To rule out equilibria with
implicit agreements between the players, we restrict attention to Markov strategies and look
for a Markov Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (MPBE). Because of symmetry, it is suﬃcient to
state most of the deÞnitions and results in terms of player 1.
Strategies
A Markov strategy depends only on the payoﬀ relevant information in date t but not on the
entire history up to t. In our setup, the only payoﬀ relevant information in date t is players
beliefs in t. To deÞne a Markov strategy properly, denote by σ (and ϕ respectively) the event
that player 1 wins (loses) the contest in a given period. Let
Ht =
©¡
e11, e
1
2,ω
1, ..., et1, e
t
2,ω
t
¢ | esi ∈ {0, 1} ,ωs ∈ {σ,ϕ} , 1 ≤ s ≤ tª (12)
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be the set of all possible histories up to t, and let H = ∪Ht be the set of all possible histories.8
DeÞnition 1 1) A (pure) strategy ηi = (ηti)t=0,1,... for player i is a sequence of mappings where
each ηti maps histories into actions, that is,
ηti : Ht → {0, 1} . (13)
The set of all strategies for player i is denoted by Σi.
2) A (stationary) Markov strategy ηi for player i maps beliefs into actions, that is,
ηi : [0, 1]
2 → {0, 1} . (14)
Notice that we require a Markov strategy to be stationary, that is, to be the same for all
periods t. Denote by γt the state in t, and let Γ = [0, 1]2 be the set of all possible states.
Because players are Bayesian rational, beliefs are derived by Bayes rule. Let γ σ = (γ σ1 , γ
ϕ
2 ) be
the updated beliefs upon player 1 winning and player 2 losing. That is, for (e1, e2),
γ σ1 (e1, e2; γ) =
Pr [σ |αH ] γ1
Pr [σ]
(15)
=
[p (e1, e2; (αH ,αH)) γ2 + p (e1, e2; (αH ,αL)) (1− γ2)] γ1
π (e1, e2; γ)
. (16)
DeÞne γ ϕ likewise. Notice, by deÞnition of our contest success function, the belief is not up-
dated if one player chooses 0 eﬀort because in this case the contest outcome does not depend
on abilities and is therefore not informative.
Utility
Before deÞning a players expected utility, we need Þrst to deÞne the appropriate probability
measure.9
A Markov strategy η2 of player 2 gives rise to a law of motion that can be controlled by
player 1. The resulting transition probabilities govern the evolution of states accordingly. More
formally, for e1 ∈ {0, 1},
q (γ0 | e1, η2 (γ) , γ) =

π (e1, η2 (γ) ; γ) if γ0 = γσ
1− π (e1, η2 (γ) ; γ) if γ0 = γϕ
(17)
8Note, H0 = {∅}.
9Our construction of the probability space is somewhat sloppy. We neglect measurability issues and the
proper deÞnition of σ-algebras.
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deÞnes a transition kernel from current states γ into next period states γ0. q (γ0 | e1, η2 (γ) , γ)
may be viewed as the (expected) conditional probability that the next period state is γ0, condi-
tional on the current state being γ, when player 2 plays η2, and player 1 plays e1 in the current
period.
Suppose that player 1 plays a strategy η1 ∈ Σ1, and let the initial state be γ0. Then the
probability of a Þnite sequence ωt = (ω1, ...,ωt) ,ωs ∈ {σ,ϕ} of successes and failures for player
1 is given by
P t
£
ωt ; η1, η2, γ
0
¤
=
tY
s=1
q
¡
γs | ηs−11 (hs−1) , η2
¡
γs−1
¢
, γs−1
¢
, (18)
where hs is the (unique) history induced by ωt, η1, η2, and γs is the (unique) belief induced by hs.
It is well known that the measures P t thus deÞned constitute a consistent family of probability
measures. Hence, by Kolmogorovs consistency theorem, there is a unique probability measure
P [· ; η1, η2, γ0] on the set of inÞnite sequences ω = (ω1, ...,ωt, ...) ,ωt ∈ {σ,ϕ} such that P and
P t coincide on the Þnite sequences of length t. That is, for all Þnite sequences ωt it holds
P
£
ωt ; η1, η2, γ
0
¤
= P t
£
ωt ; η1, η2, γ
0
¤
. (19)
With this we can deÞne a players expected utility. Player 1s expected current payoﬀ from
playing e1 at a given state is π (e1, η2 (γ) ; γ) − ce1. Player 1s expected utility from strategy
η1 ∈ Σ1 against a Markov strategy η2 at initial state γ is thus given by
U1 (η1, η2; γ) =
Z ∞X
t=0
δt
£
π
¡
ηt1 (ht) , η2
¡
γt
¢
; γt
¢− cηt1 (ht)¤ dP (ω ; η1, η2, γ) , (20)
where the integration is over all inÞnite sequences ω, and ht and γt are the (unique) histories
and beliefs induced by ω, η1, η2, γ.
Best Response
Player 1s best response η∗1 against a Markov η2 is thus given as a solution to the maximization
problem
sup
η1∈Σ1
U1 (η1, η2; γ) . (MP)
We derive the best response by dynamic programming. The Bellman equation for problem
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(MP) is
V1 (γ) = max
e1∈{0,1}
{π (e1, η2 (γ) ; γ)− ce1 + (BE)
+δ [π (e1, η2 (γ) ; γ)V1 (γ
σ) + (1− π (e1, η2 (γ) ; γ))V1 (γ ϕ)]} .
It is well known that a solution V1 to (BE) coincides with supU1. Furthermore, if a solution to
(BE) exists, then the maximizer in (BE) at state γ coincides with the best response in (MP)
at state γ. In particular, the best response is (stationary) Markov (see Blackwell (1965)).
Hence, to establish existence of a Markov best response, it remains to show that (BE)
has a solution V1. We do this in the usual way by showing that V1 is the limit of iterated
applications of a contraction mapping. To deÞne the contraction, let S be the space of all
continuous functions on Γ equipped with the supremums norm. Let ψ ∈ S, and deÞne the
operator F : S → S by
Fψ (γ) = max
e1∈{0,1}
{π (e1, η2 (γ))− ce1+ (21)
+ δ [π (e1, η2 (γ))ψ (γ
σ) + (1− π (e1, η2 (γ)))ψ (γ ϕ)] .}
Hence, V1 is the solution to the Þxed point problem FV = V .10 We Þrst show that F is a
contraction.
Proposition 4 F is a contraction.
The proof, which is in the appendix, shows that Blackwells suﬃciency conditions are sat-
isÞed. Because F is a contraction, a Þxed point exists and is continuous.
Proposition 5 For all η2, V1 exists and is continuous.
Proof : Existence: Since F is a contraction, it follows by Banachs Þxed-point theorem that
the Þxed-point problem FV = V has a unique solution. This establishes existence of V1.
Continuity: It is well known that V1 is the limit of iterated applications of F on an arbitrary
starting point ψ ∈ S. Notice that Fψ ∈ S since all function on the right hand side of (21) are
continuous. Thus, all elements of the sequence (F nψ)n=1,2,... are in S. Since S is complete, the
10Note that both F and the corresponding Þxed point V1 depend on a speciÞc Markov strategy η2. Provided
it does not cause confusion, we shall suppress this dependency.
13
limit of this sequence is a member of S, thus continuous. ¤
Threshold Strategies
The previous considerations show that a best response against a Markov strategy exists and
is again Markov. This could be used to establish the existence of a MPBE by an abstract
existence theorem (see Maskin/Tirole (2001)). However, it would not tell much about how the
equilibrium looks like, and how the system evolves over time in this equilibrium. Therefore, we
shall further restrict the strategy space so as to derive a more speciÞc equilibrium. The case
with myopic players suggests to look for an equilibrium in threshold strategies. A threshold
strategy is a strategy where a player chooses high eﬀort only when his own belief is suﬃciently
large and his rivals belief is suﬃciently small. More formally:
DeÞnition 2 A Markov strategy ηi is called threshold strategy if there is an increasing function
r : [0, 1]→ [−1, 1] such that
η1 (γi, γ−i) = 1⇐⇒ γi > r
¡
γ+−i
¢
, (22)
where r (γ+) = limγ0¸γ r (γ0) is the right-hand limit.
Notice that the right-hand limit exists because r (γ0) is decreasing for γ0 ¸ γ and bounded
from below.
If player i plays a threshold strategy, then, for Þxed γ−i, he chooses high eﬀort only if γi
is (strictly) above the threshold r
¡
γ+−i
¢
. Equivalently, for Þxed γi player i chooses high eﬀort
only if γ−i falls below the threshold given by r−1 (γ−i).11
The threshold need not be continuous. We shall construct an equilibrium in threshold
strategies as the limit of some sequence of threshold strategies. For this we need that the
limit of this sequence is again a threshold strategy. If we require a threshold strategy to be
continuous, we would need the sequence to converge uniformly. As it turns out however, this
is too strong a requirement.
Notice also that, by deÞnition, every threshold strategy is Markov.
It will be convenient to work with an equivalent notion where the threshold r is the 0-level
set of some function ψ : Γ→ R that increases if γ moves to the south-east.
11If r is not strictly increasing or discountinuous, r−1 is to be understood as the generalized inverse deÞned
by r−1 (γi) = inf {γ−i| r (γ−i) ≥ γi}.
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DeÞnition 3 ψ : Γ→ R is called increasing towards the south-east, or SE-increasing, if
(i) for all γ2 it holds: γ1 ≥ eγ1 ⇒ ψ (γ1, γ2) ≥ ψ (eγ1, γ2),
(ii) for all γ1 it holds: γ2 ≥ eγ2 ⇒ ψ (γ1, γ2) ≤ ψ (γ1, eγ2).
Proposition 6 A strategy ηi is a threshold strategy if, and only if, there is a continuous SE-
increasing function ψ ∈ S such that
ηi (γ1, γ2) =

1 if ψ (γi, γ−i) > 0
0 if ψ (γi, γ−i) ≤ 0.
(23)
The proof is in the appendix. A threshold strategy divides the state space Γ into two
connected sets: one in which eﬀort is chosen, and one in which no eﬀort is chosen. We call the
latter no-eﬀort set.
DeÞnition 4 Let ηi be a threshold strategy. DeÞne by
N (ηi) = {(γ1, γ2) | ηi (γ1, γ2) = 0} (24)
the set of states where player i chooses no eﬀort under ηi.12
The no-eﬀort set measures how aggressive a strategy is. The smaller a players no-eﬀort set,
the more aggressive this player.
With these deÞnitions, there are four equivalent ways of describing a threshold strategy:
η, r,ψ, N . In the sequel, we shall use the notion which is most convenient for the problem at
hand.
Equilibrium
Our aim is to show that there is a MPBE in threshold strategies. For this, we proceed as
follows. We Þrst show that a best response against a threshold strategy is again a threshold
strategy. Then we show that best responses against threshold strategies have some monotonicity
properties, and that the best response correspondence is continuous. Monotonicity says that a
player responds to more aggressive strategies with more defensive strategies. We then consider
the sequence of mutual best responses which is induced when one player starts with the most
12If no cause for confusion, we shall omit the argument and write Ni instead of N (ηi).
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aggressive strategy η ≡ 1. Monotonicity will imply that this sequence is monotone and therefore
converges. By construction, and by continuity of the best response correspondence, the limit
will then be an equilibrium in threshold strategies.
Our Þrst result is that the value function against a threshold strategy is SE-increasing.
Because it is continuous, it induces a threshold strategy. It turns out that this threshold
strategy is a best response. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Let η2 be a threshold strategy. Then it holds:
(i) V1 is SE-increasing.
(ii) The threshold strategy induced by V1 is a best response for player 1 against η2, that is,
η∗1 (γ) =

1 if V1 (γ) > 0
0 if V1 (γ) = 0.
(25)
The intuition is as follows. Because player 2 plays a threshold strategy, player 2 does not
exert eﬀort, if γ2 is small and γ1 is large. Player 1 should then exert eﬀort, because this
guarantees him a success at relatively small cost. Indeed, since updating stops if player 2
ceases to spend eﬀort, player 1 obtains the highest possible value (1− c) / (1− δ) in this case.
As soon as player 2 starts to exert eﬀort, player 1s utility from exerting eﬀort consists of the
current value π − c and the future value from learning. As γ1 tends to 0, and γ2 tends to 1,
the current value monotonically declines and becomes eventually negative, and the future value
monotonically declines to 0. Hence, there is threshold beyond which utility becomes negative.
Thus, beyond this threshold, player 1 optimally stops exerting eﬀort, and his value is V1 = 0.
To show that an equilibrium in threshold strategies exists, we shall consider a particular
sequence of mutual best responses. To show that the sequence converges, we need the following
monotonicity result.
Proposition 8 Let η2, eη2 be threshold strategies. Then it holds:
(i) η1 = BR1 (η2) =⇒ N (η1) ∩N (η2) = ∅.
(ii) η2 ≥ eη2 =⇒ BR1 (η2) ≤ BR1 (eη2).13
13η ≥ eη if, and only if, η (γ) ≥ eη (γ) for all γ ∈ Γ. Equivalently: η ≥ eη if, and only if, N (η) ⊆ N (eη).
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Here, BRi denotes player is best response correspondence on the set of threshold strategies
of player −i. Property (i) says that, whenever player 2 chooses no eﬀort, player 1 optimally
exerts eﬀort. This follows by the same argument as in the previous paragraph.
Property (ii) says that a player responds to more aggressive strategies by more defensive
ones. Intuitively, the logic is as follows. Suppose, player 2 exerts eﬀort. If player 1 exerts
eﬀort, the process continues, and there are essentially two events: in the favourable event, the
process reaches player 2s no-eﬀort set in Þnite time from which on player 1 will win forever.
In the unfavourable event, player 2s no-eﬀort set is not reached in Þnite time in which case
player 1 gets less than what he would, had player 2s no-eﬀort set been reached. Now, player
2 becoming less aggressive means that his no-eﬀort set becomes larger. But this makes the
favourable event more likely which raises player 1s utility from exerting eﬀort and thereby the
incentives to exert eﬀort.
We now come to convergence. We shall use the notion of pointwise (statewise) convergence.
A sequence of threshold strategies (ηn)n converges pointwisely to a strategy η if the sequence
(ηn (γ))n converges to η (γ) for all γ ∈ Γ. This implies that the corresponding sequence of
thresholds (rn) converges pointwisely. Accordingly, there is a function r : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such
that
rn (γ) →
n→∞
r (γ) for all γ ∈ [0, 1] . (26)
It is easily seen that r is increasing. Thus, r gives rise to a threshold strategy eη. But it is
straighforward to show that η coincides with eη. Thus, η is a threshold strategy, and the set of
threshold strategies is complete with respect to pointwise convergence.
We now deÞne the following sequence η = (ηn1 , η
n
2 )n=1,2,... of mutual best responses by
η12 ≡ 1, (27)
ηn1 = BR1 (η
n
2 ) for n = 1, 2, ..., (28)
ηn2 = BR2
¡
ηn−11
¢
for n = 2, 3, ... . (29)
The sequence thus deÞned is monotone and converges:
Proposition 9 The sequence η is increasing in the Þrst, and decreasing in the second argument,
that is,
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(i) ηn1 ≥ ηn+11 for n = 1, 2, ...
(ii) ηn2 ≤ ηn+12 for n = 1, 2, ...
Moreover, η converges to a limit of threshold strategies (η∗1, η
∗
2).
Results (i) and (ii), which follow by induction, are a consequence of Proposition 8. As a
bounded, monotone sequence, η converges, and the limit is a pair of threshold strategies because
the space of threshold strategies is complete. A proof is in the appendix.
To show that the limit (η∗1, η
∗
2) is an equilibrium, we need that BR is continuous. This is
shown in the next proposition. The proof, which is technical, is in the appendix.
Proposition 10 Let
¡
ηn−i
¢
n
be a sequence of threshold strategies with ηn−i →
n→∞
η−i. Then
BRi
¡
ηn−i
¢ →
n→∞
BRi (η−i) . (30)
We are now in the position to state that an equilibrium in threshold strategies exists.
Theorem 1 (η∗1, η
∗
2) is a MPBE, and it holds:
(i) There is a ρ > 0 such that
{γ ∈ Γ | kγ − (1, 0)k < ρ} ⊂ N∗2 , (31)
{γ ∈ Γ | kγ − (0, 1)k < ρ} ⊂ N∗1 . (32)
(ii) N∗1 ∩N∗2 = ∅.
That (η∗1, η
∗
2) is an equilibrium, follows by construction of η as a sequence of mutual best
responses and by continuity of BR. Properties (i) and (ii) are general properties of any equi-
librium in threshold strategies. Property (i), which is a consequence of continuity of V1, says
that player is no-eﬀort contains a small neighbourhood around the worst state where γi = 0
and γ−i = 1. Eﬀectively, this implies that a players no-eﬀort set is reached in Þnite time if
this player loses suﬃciently often. Property (ii) says that at least one player exerts eﬀort in
equilibrium. This is direct consequence of Proposition 8 (i). A typical equilibrium may thus
look as follows.14
14We have not looked at whether the equilibrium is unique or symmetric, because this is not needed to make
our main point.
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Learning
We can now state our main result that players will fail to learn their true abilities. Let
T (ω) = min
©
t ≥ 0 | γt (ω) ∈ N∗1 ∪N∗2
ª
(33)
be the Þrst period in which one player ceases to spend eﬀort. If this period is reached, the
process stops and no information is generated any more. Also, by Theorem 1 (ii), one player
will win and the other player will lose forever from that point on. Intuitively, N∗1 ∪N∗2 will be
reached in Þnite time, because it contains small neighbourhoods around the most discrepant
beliefs. For, one player will experience a very long sequence of consecutive successes, thus,
beliefs increasingly diverge, and the other players no-eﬀort set is reached. More precisely, we
have the following result.
Theorem 2 For all scenarios (α1,α2), learning will be incomplete, and with positive probability
one player will be discouraged in the long run, that is,
P [T <∞ | η∗1, η∗2; (α1,α2)] > 0. (34)
Proof : The proof is essentially the same as in Proposition 1. Due to Bayesian updating, it
requires a Þnite number of consecutive successes for one player for the state to move arbitrarily
closely to either (1, 0) or (0, 1). Therefore, because of property (i) of Theorem 1, it takes a
Þnite number of successes of player i for the state to reach N∗−i. But conditional on (α1,α2),
sequences are independent. Therefore, with positive probability in all scenarios (α1,α2), one
player will have a suﬃciently long sequence of successes such that the other players no eﬀort
set is reached. In this case, because of property (ii) of Theorem 1, the more conÞdent player
exerts eﬀort whereas the other player resigns. ¤
As a consequence, persistent inequality arises in the long run. One player may eventually
win the contest forever and become rich whereas the other player will be discouraged and stay
poor. In particular, for example in scenario (αH ,αL), where player 1 is the better and player 2
the worse player, player 2 has a positive chance to be the long term winner. In this sense, the
wrong player may be prevailing in the long run.
To see the diﬀerence between a contest and a single decision maker problem, consider two
individuals who, independently from each other, have to perform an inÞnite sequence of tasks
with success probability αe at cost ce. It is known from the literature on bandit problems that
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in this case both individuals may eventually stop exerting eﬀort. This is because both players
may fail and thus be discouraged at the same time. In contrast, in a contest one player getting
less conÞdent implies that the other player gets more conÞdent.
In our speciÞc contest, there is an additional element of strategic interaction in that a
players winning chance does not depend on ability if the other player exerts no eﬀort. In a
Markov equilibrium, this implies that the belief process stops if one player stops exerting eﬀort.
If, instead, a players winning chance did always depend on ability, then even a highly conÞ-
dent and highly able player would at some point experience a long streak of failures and lose
conÞdence. At the same time, the other player would be encouraged. We therefore conjecture
that at least in the medium term we would observe swings between long winning sequences
of either player. Whether and under what conditions this would lead to learning or to cyclical
behaviour in the long run, is an open question.
ConÞdence
We consider now the impact of conÞdence on the likelihood to be the long-run winner. For this,
deÞne by
Ti (ω) = min
©
t ≥ 0 | γt (ω) ∈ N∗i
ª
(35)
the Þrst entry time into N∗i . The following result says that the more conÞdent a player and the
less conÞdent his rival, the higher the likelihood to reach the rivals no-eﬀort set.
Theorem 3 For all scenarios (α1,α2), the likelihood to reach the rival players no eﬀort set in
Þnite time is increasing in own and decreasing in the rivals conÞdence, that is,
P [T−i < Ti | η∗1, η∗2; (α1,α2)] is increasing in γi and decreasing in γ−i. (36)
Proof : The proof is straightforward. The higher γi, and the smaller γ−i, the closer the
state is at N∗−i. Therefore, less successes are required to move into N
∗
−i. ¤
Furthermore, because Vi is SE-increasing, player is expected utility is increasing in γi and
decreasing in γ−i. In this sense, conÞdence is self-serving. Admittedly, given complementarity,
this result is not too surprising. Nevertheless, it illustrates that perception might be an impor-
tant factor in contests, and that long term success may not necessarily be the result of ability
but rather of conÞdence in combination with an initial streak of good luck.
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5 Conclusion
The paper discusses the role of conÞdence in a repeated contest when players do not know
their intrinsic abilities. The basic idea is that complementarity of ability and eﬀort gives rise to
a belief reinforcment eﬀect which encourages conÞdent players and discourages less conÞdent
players. In our example, this implis that players may fail to learn their true abilities in the long
run, and one player may eventually win forever. As a consequence, persistent inequality arises,
and the actually worse player may be the long run winner. Furthermore, conÞdence is self-
serving in that it increases a players utility and the likelihood to be the eventually prevailing
player.
The speciÞc form of our contest somewhat limits the generality of our results. However,
as already discussed in the previous section, some qualitative characteristics of the belief rein-
forcement mechanism can be expected to carry over to more general contests.
More importantly, we have neglected the fact that high conÞdence often leads to excessive
risk taking, countervailing the self-serving eﬀect of conÞdence (see Baumeister (1998) for ev-
idence and Benabou/Tirole (2002a, 2002b) for a model). Recent contest literature suggests
that at least in some contests risk taking may be beneÞcial (Hvide (2000), Kräkel (2002)). To
what extent this would strengthen the self-serving eﬀect of conÞdence is a question for future
research.
Finally, we have also set aside the possibility that players may accumulate wealth over time.
This should lead to an even more pronounced reinforcement eﬀect, as the wealthier player can
invest more resources in the contest, thus, increasing his chance to succeed, and, in turn, to
become even wealthier.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4: We use Blackwells suﬃciency condition, i.e., we have to show:
(i) For all ψ,φ ∈ S with ψ ≥ φ on Γ, it holds that Fψ ≥ Fφ on Γ.
(ii) For all ψ ∈ S and ξ > 0, there is a β ∈ (0, 1) such that F (ψ + ξ) ≤ Fψ + βξ.
Ad (i): Let ψ,φ ∈ S with ψ ≥ φ on Γ. Let
³
eψ1 , e
φ
1
´
∈ {0, 1} be the maximizers of Fψ and Fφ,
respectively. There are four possible cases:
³
eψ1 , e
φ
1
´
= (0, 0) ,
³
eψ1 , e
φ
1
´
= (1, 1) ,
³
eψ1 , e
φ
1
´
=
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(1, 0) ,
³
eψ1 , e
φ
1
´
= (0, 1). For eψ1 = e
φ
1 the claim follows immediately. If
³
eψ1 , e
φ
1
´
= (1, 0),
then15
Fψ = π (1, η2)− c+ δ [π (1, η2)ψ σ + (1− π (1, η2))ψ ϕ] (37)
≥ π (0, η2) + δ [π (0, η2)ψ σ + (1− π (0, η2))ψ ϕ] (38)
≥ π (0, η2) + δ [π (0, η2)φσ + (1− π (0, η2))φϕ] (39)
= Fφ. (40)
The Þrst inequality follows by deÞnition of the maximum, and the second inequality follows by
the assumption that ψ ≥ φ. The case
³
eψ1 , e
φ
1
´
= (0, 1) is shown in the same way.
Ad (ii): Let ψ ∈ S and ξ > 0, and let β = δ. Then
F (ψ + ξ) = max
e1∈{0,1}
{π (e1, η2)− ce1 + δ [π (e1, η2)ψ σ + (1− π (e1, η2))ψ ϕ] + (41)
+ δ [π (e1, η2) ξ + (1− π (e1, η2)) ξ] (42)
= Fψ + βξ. (43)
This shows that F is a contraction. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6: Let ψ be given. DeÞne r (γ−i) = sup {r ∈ [0, 1] |ψ (r, γ−i) ≤ 0}.
Since ψ is SE-increasing, r is increasing. Since ψ is continuous, the supremum is assumed and
ψ
¡
r
¡
γ+−i
¢
, γ−i
¢ ≤ 0. Therefore, if γi > r ¡γ+−i¢, then ψ ¡r ¡γ+−i¢ , γ−i¢ > 0, hence η (γi, γ−i) = 1.
For the converse, let r be given. W.l.o.g., let r be not constantly equal to 1 or 0 (in
this case, deÞne ψ constantly equal to 1 or −1). DeÞne ψ (γi, γ−i) = 0 for γi ≤ r
¡
γ+−i
¢
,
and deÞne ψ (1, 0) = 1. For all other (γi, γ−i) deÞne ψ as follows. Connect each point in©
(γi, γ−i) | γi ∈
£
r
¡
γ−−i
¢
, r
¡
γ+−i
¢¤ª
and the point ψ (1, 0) by a straight line and let ψ be the
resulting function. (r
¡
γ−−i
¢
is the left-hand limit.) ψ is obviously continuous, and since r is in-
creasing, ψ is SE-increasing. Finally, by construction, ψ (γi, γ−i) > 0 if, and only if, γi > r
¡
γ+−i
¢
.
¤
Proof of Proposition 7: To show (i), we need some preliminary results. It is convenient
to work with the following deÞnition. Let η2 be a threshold strategy. Denote by S+,c the set of
all functions in S that are SE-increasing and constant on N2.
15In what follows, we shall occasionally suppress the argument γ and write ψσ instead of ψ (γσ ) etc.
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Notice that S+,c is complete.16 The following proposition states that F maps S+,c in S+,c.
Proposition 11 Let η2 be a threshold strategy, and let ψ ∈ S+,c. Then Fψ ∈ S+,c.
Since F preserves S+,c, all elements of a sequence (Fnψ)n=1,2,... with ψ ∈ S+,c are in S+,c.
Since S+,c is complete, the limit V1 of such a sequence is a member of S+,c with respect to the
supremum norm, in particular, it is SE-increasing. This shows (i).
Proof of Proposition 11: We show Þrst that Fψ is SE-increasing. Let γ1 ≥ eγ1. We
have to show that Fψ (γ1, γ2) ≥ Fψ (eγ1, γ2) for all γ2. Let e1, e1 ∈ {0, 1} be the maximizers of
Fψ (γ1, γ2) and Fψ (eγ1, γ2), respectively. Suppose Þrstcase I)that e1 = 1 and e1 = 1. Then
Fψ (γ1, γ2) = π (1, η2 (γ))− c+ δ [π (1, η2 (γ))ψ (γ σ) + (1− π (1, η2 (γ)))ψ (γ ϕ)] , (44)
and
Fψ (eγ1, γ2) = π (1, η2 (eγ))− c+ δ [π (1, η2 (eγ))ψ (eγ σ) + (1− π (1, η2 (eγ)))ψ (eγ ϕ)] . (45)
Since η2 is a threshold strategy, η2 (γ1, γ2) ≤ η2 (eγ1, γ2). Hence, there are three possible cases:
A): η2 (γ1, γ2) = η2 (eγ1, γ2) = 1, B): η2 (γ1, γ2) = η2 (eγ1, γ2) = 0, and C): η2 (γ1, γ2) = 0 and
η2 (eγ1, γ2) = 1. Consider Þrst case A). In this case,
π (1, η2 (γ)) = 1/2 + (γ1 − γ2)∆α ≥ 1/2 + (eγ1 − γ2)∆α = π (1, η2 (eγ)) . (46)
Furthermore, monotonicity of Bayes rule implies that γ σ1 ≥ eγ σ1 and γ ϕ1 ≤ eγ ϕ1 , thus, because
ψ is SE-increasing, ψ (γ σ) ≥ ψ (eγ σ) and ψ (γ ϕ) ≥ ψ (eγ ϕ). This implies that Fψ (γ1, γ2) ≥
Fψ (eγ1, γ2).
Consider next case B): η2 (γ1, γ2) = η2 (eγ1, γ2) = 0. Then, because beliefs are not updated
if no eﬀort is chosen,
Fψ (γ1, γ2) = 1− c + δψ (γ) , (47)
and
Fψ (eγ1, γ2) = 1− c + δψ (eγ) . (48)
Hence, since ψ is SE-increasing, Fψ (γ1, γ2) ≥ Fψ (eγ1, γ2).
16This is because the SE-increasing concept involves only weak inequalities.
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Consider Þnally case C): η2 (γ1, γ2) = 0 and η2 (eγ1, γ2) = 1. Then
Fψ (γ1, γ2) = 1− c + δψ (γ) , (49)
and
Fψ (eγ1, γ2) = π (1, η2 (eγ))− c+ δ [π (1, η2 (eγ))ψ (eγ σ) + (1− π (1, η2 (eγ)))ψ (eγ ϕ)] . (50)
Notice Þrst that 1 ≥ π (1, η2 (eγ)). Moreover, ψ (γ) ≥ ψ (eγ ϕ), because ψ is SE-increasing.
Furthermore, ψ is SE-increasing and constant on N2. Hence, ψ is maximal on N2. But, by
assumption η2 (γ1, γ2) = 0, thus (γ1, γ2) ∈ N2. Hence, ψ (γ) ≥ ψ (eγ σ). All three arguments
together imply that Tψ (γ1, γ2) ≥ Tψ (eγ1, γ2).
This shows the claim for case I). Cases II): e1 = 0, e1 = 0, III): e1 = 1, e1 = 0, and IV):
e1 = 0, e1 = 1 follow analogously.
Likewise, it follows that Fψ (γ1, eγ2) ≥ Fψ (γ1, γ2) for γ2 ≥ eγ2 and for all γ1. This shows
that Fψ is SE-increasing.
It remains to show that Fψ is constant on N2. Let γ ∈ N2. Hence, whatever player 1
chooses, there will be no updating, since player 2 chooses e2 = 0. Therefore, e1 = 0 yields
1/2 + δψ (γ), and e1 = 1 yields 1− c + δψ (γ). Since, by assumption, 1− c > 1/2, e1 = 1 is a
maximizer of Fψ (γ). Thus,
Fψ (γ) = 1− c+ δψ (γ) for all γ ∈ N2. (51)
Since, by assumption, ψ is constant on N2, it follows that Fψ is constant on N2. ¤
It remains to show part (ii) of Proposition 7. For this, let η2 be given. Consider a best
response of player 1 against η2. It may be that in some states player 1 is indiﬀerent between
e1 = 1 and e1 = 0. To break ties we assume that in these cases player 1 chooses e1 = 0. The
best response gets thus single-valued. Let η1 be such a statewise single-valued best response
against η2. We show
(a) If η1 (γ) = 0, then V1 (γ) = 0
(b) If η1 (γ) = 1, then V1 (γ) > 0.
In other words: η1 (γ) = 1 if, and only if, V1 (γ) > 0.
Ad (a): Let η1 (γ) = 0. Suppose, η2 (γ) = 0. Compare player 1s value of playing e1 = 1 and
of playing e1 = 0, conditional on optimal continuation. Since η2 (γ) = 0, there is no learning
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and the future value δV1 (γ) is the same for both e1 = 1 and e1 = 0. The current value of e1 = 1
is 1− c, whereas the current value of e1 = 0 is 1/2 < 1− c. Thus η1 (γ) = 1, a contradiction.
Therefore, η2 (γ) = 1. In this case, since η1 (γ) = 0, there is again no updating, and player 1s
value is given by
V1 (γ) = 0 + δV1 (γ) . (52)
This implies that V1 (γ) = 0.
Ad (b): Let η1 (γ) = 1. Suppose, η2 (γ) = 0. Then, player 1 wins with certainty and again
there is no updating. Player 1s value is thus given by
V1 (γ) = 1− c+ δV1 (γ) . (53)
Hence V1 (γ) = (1− c) / (1− δ) > 0.
Suppose, η2 (γ) = 1. We have seen under (a) that the value from e1 = 0 against η2 (γ) = 1,
conditional on optimal continuation, is equal to 0. Our tie-breaking rule implies that player
1 strictly prefers e1 = 1 to e1 = 0, if η1 (γ) = 1. Thus, if η1 (γ) = 1, it must be that V1 (γ) > 0. ¤
Proof of Proposition 8: Ad (i): Suppose, there is a state in which player 1 chooses e1 = 0
against e2 = 0. Then he gets 0. Yet, if player 1 deviates and chooses e1 = 1 instead, he gets
(1− c) / (1− δ) > 0. This implies the claim.
Ad (ii): Let η2 ≥ eη2. Denote by η1, eη1 the corresponding best responses, and by V1, eV1 the cor-
responding value functions of player 1. By Proposition 7, η1 (γ) = 1 if, and only if, V1 (γ) > 0.
Hence, it is enough to show that
eV1 (γ) ≥ V1 (γ) for all γ ∈ Γ. (54)
We shall show that η1 gives a higher utility against eη2, than η1 gives against η2. That is,
U1 (η1, eη2) ≥ U1 (η1, η2) . (55)
By deÞnition of a best response, this implies, eV1 ≥ U1 (η1, eη2) ≥ U1 (η1, η2) = V1.
To show (55), let γ0 = γ ∈ Γ, and let ω be an inÞnite sequence ω = (ω1, ...,ωt, ...) ,ωt ∈ {σ,ϕ}
of successes and failures of player 1. Let (γt)t=1,2,... be the unique sequence of beliefs induced
by ω under strategies η1, η2, and initial state γ0. Likewise, let (eγt)t=1,2,... the beliefs induced
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under η1, eη2, and initial state γ0. We divide now N (eη2) into several sets. DeÞne
A = N (η1) ∩N (eη2) , (56)
B = N (eη2) \N (η2) , (57)
C = N (eη2) \ (A ∪B) . (58)
The following picture illustrates these sets.
Notice that C is well deÞned because, by assumption, η2 ≥ eη2.
Clearly, N (eη2) = A ∪ B ∪ C. Hence, if player 2 plays eη2, once the state has reached A, or
B, or C, the process stops, and players receive a constant per period payoﬀ from then on. In
particular, suppose, (η1, eη2) is played. Then, if the state reaches A, both players exert no eﬀort
from then on, and player 1 gets per period payoﬀ 1/2. If the state reaches B or C, then e1 = 1
and e2 = 0, and player 1 obtains per period payoﬀ (1− c) from then on. Suppose instead,
(η1, η2) is played. Then player 1 receives the same as under (η1, eη2) when the state reaches
B. But, he receives less than under (η1, eη2) when the state reaches A or C, because under η2,
player 2 chooses eﬀort e2 = 1 on C.
This argument suggests that (η1, η2) is better for player 1 than (η1, eη2). To make it more
precise, we write the overall utility of player 1 in terms of Þrst entry times in these sets. DeÞne
for j = A,C
Tj (ω) = min
©
t ≥ 0 | γt (ω) ∈ jª . (59)
Furthermore, deÞne by
{TA < TC} = {ω |TA (ω) <∞, TA (ω) < TC (ω)} (60)
the event that the state reaches A in Þnite time and that A is reached before B.17 DeÞne
17Again, we neglect measurability issues. If we had deÞned the probability space properly, it would however
be easy to show that Tj is a stopping time and that {TA < TB} is measurable.
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likewise {TC < TA}. Then, with ηti = ηi (γt), the utility of player 1 is
U1 (η1, η2) =
Z ∞X
t=0
δt
£
π
¡
ηt1, η
t
2; γ
t
¢− cηt1¤ dP (ω ; η1, η2, γ) (61)
=
Z
{TA<TC}
∞X
t=0
δt
£
π
¡
ηt1, η
t
2; γ
t
¢− cηt1¤ dP (ω ; η1, η2, γ) (62)
+
Z
{TC<TA}
∞X
t=0
δt
£
π
¡
ηt1, η
t
2; γ
t
¢− cηt1¤ dP (ω ; η1, η2, γ) (63)
+
Z
{TA=TC=∞}
∞X
t=0
δt
£
π
¡
ηt1, η
t
2; γ
t
¢− cηt1¤ dP (ω ; η1, η2, γ) (64)
We can split the sum in (62) into dates before and after A is reached, that is, the integral in
(62) is equal toZ
{TA<TC}
TA−1X
t=1
δt
£
π
¡
ηt1, η
t
2; γ
t
¢− cηt1¤+ δTA(ω)V1 ¡γTA(ω)¢ dP (ω ; η1, η2, γ) . (65)
For (63) we obtain the corresponding expression. Now notice that the two proÞles (η1, η2) and
(η1, eη2) coincide as long as A or C is not reached. Hence, before A or C is reached both the
transition probabilities and the current payoﬀ are the same under (η1, η2) and under (η1, eη2).
Therefore, Z
{TA<TC}
TA−1X
t=0
δt
£
π
¡
ηt1, η
t
2; γ
t
¢− cηt1¤ dP (ω ; η1, η2, γ) (66)
+
Z
{TC<TA}
TC−1X
t=0
δt
£
π
¡
ηt1, η
t
2; γ
t
¢− cηt1¤ dP (ω ; η1, η2, γ) (67)
=
Z
{TA<TC}
TA−1X
t=0
δt
£
π
¡
ηt1, eηt2; γt¢− cηt1¤ dP (ω ; η1, eη2, γ) (68)
+
Z
{TC<TA}
TC−1X
t=0
δt
£
π
¡
ηt1, eηt2; γt¢− cηt1¤ dP (ω ; η1, eη2, γ) . (69)
By the same argument, since (η1, η2) and (η1, eη2) coincide on the set {TA = TC =∞}, the
integral in (64) is the same under (η1, η2) and (η1, eη2).
Furthermore, when A is reached, player 1 stops exerting eﬀort while player 2 does not under
(η1, η2), thus
V1
¡
γTA(ω)
¢
= 0. (70)
However, when A is reached under (η1, eη2), both players stop exerting eﬀort, thus
U1 (η1, eη2) ¡γTA(ω)¢ = 1
2 (1− δ) . (71)
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When C is reached under (η1, eη2), then only player 2 stops exerting eﬀort, thus
U1 (η1, eη2) ¡γTC(ω)¢ = 1− c
1− δ ≥ V1
¡
γTC(ω)
¢
, (72)
where the inequality holds because V1 is bounded by (1− c) / (1− δ). Hence, we can estimate
U1 (η1, η2) againstZ
{TA<TC}
TA−1X
t=0
δt
£
π
¡
ηt1, eηt2; γt¢− cηt1¤+ δTA(ω)U1 (η1, eη2) ¡γTA(ω)¢ dP (ω ; η1, eη2, γ) (73)
+
Z
{TC<TA}
TC−1X
t=0
δt
£
π
¡
ηt1, eηt2; γt¢− cηt1¤+ δTC(ω)U1 (η1, eη2) ¡γTC(ω)¢ dP (ω ; η1, eη2, γ) (74)
+
Z
{TA=TC=∞}
∞X
t=0
δt
£
π
¡
ηt1, eηt2; γt¢− cηt1¤ dP (ω ; η1, eη2, γ) . (75)
But this sum is just equal to U1 (η1, eη2). Thus, (55) is shown. ¤
Proof of Proposition 9: Ad (i) and (ii): The proof is by induction. Let n = 1. Clearly
η12 ≡ 1 ≥ η22, hence (ii). Thus, by Proposition 8 (ii), η11 = BR1 (η12) ≤ BR1 (η22) = η21, hence
(i). Let (i) and (ii) hold for i = 1, ..., n. Then, by (ii) and Proposition 8 (ii), ηn1 = BR1 (η
n
2 ) ≤
BR1
¡
ηn+12
¢
= ηn+11 , thus, (i) holds for n + 1. Likewise, η
n+1
2 = BR2
¡
ηn−11
¢ ≥ BR2 (ηn1 ) = ηn2 ,
thus, (ii) holds for n+ 1.
Convergence: Let rni be the threshold from DeÞnition 2 associated with η
n
i . By the remark
above, it is enough to show that the sequence (rni )n converges pointwisely. Consider player 1.
ηn1 ≤ ηn+11 on Γ translates into rn1 ≥ rn+11 on [0, 1]. Thus, for all γ2, the sequence (rn1 (γ2))n is
decreasing and bounded from below, hence, convergent. But, again by the remark above, the
limit is a threshold strategy. ¤
Proof of Proposition 10: We only show thatBR1 is left-continuous, that is limηn2·η2 BRi (η
n
2 ) =
BRi (η2). Right-continuity can be shown in the same way. Notice Þrst that convergence of a
sequence (ηn)n of threshold strategies is implied by pointwise convergence of the corresponding
SE-increasing functions (ψn)n. If (ψ
n)n converges pointwisely to a continuous function ψ, then
ψ is SE-increasing, and the corresponding sequence (ηn)n of threshold strategies converges to
the threshold strategy induced by ψ.
Let V n1 and V1 be the value functions associated with the best responses η
n
1 and η1 against
ηn2 and η2. By the remark above and by Proposition 7, it is enough to show that V
n
1 converges
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statewisely to V1. Since, by assumption, ηn2 ≤ ηn+12 ≤ η2, it follows from the proof of Proposition
8 that V n1 ≥ V n+11 ≥ V1. Thus, since V n1 is bounded from below, the (statewise) limit exists
and limn V n1 ≥ V1. We shall show that
U1 (η
n
1 , η
n
2 )− U1 (ηn1 , η2)→ 0. (76)
Thus, since limU1 (ηn1 , η
n
2 ) exists, it exists limU1 (η
n
1 , η2), and the two limits coincide. This
implies that limV n1 = limU1 (η
n
1 , η
n
2 ) = limU1 (η
n
1 , η2) ≤ U1 (η1, η2) = V1, where the inequality
holds because η1 is a best response against η2. Because we also have that limV n1 ≥ V1, it follows
that limV n1 = V1.
To show (76), let ε > 0. Let τ ∈ N be such that
δτ
1− c
1− δ < ε. (77)
DeÞne by
Γτ =
©
γ ∈ Γ | there is an ω such that γt (ω) = γ for t = 0, ..., τª (78)
the set of all possible states up to time τ . Because there are only two events, success or failure,
in each period, Γτ contains at most 2τ + 1 <∞ elements. Therefore, it exists
ξτ = min
γ∈Γτ \N(η2)
dist (γ, N (η2)) , (79)
where dist (γ, N (η2)) is the smallest (Euclidean) distance between γ and the closure of N (η2).
In particular, ξτ > 0.18
Let rn2 and r2 be the thresholds associated with η
n
2 and η2. DeÞne for each γ ∈ Γ the number
nτ,γ such that
rn2 (γ1)− r2 (γ1) < ξτ /2 for all n > nτ,γ . (80)
Because Γτ is Þnite, it exists
nτ = max
γ∈Γτ
nτ,γ, (81)
and it follows by construction that
¡
N
¡
ηn
τ
2
¢ \N (η2)¢ ∩ Γτ = ∅. (82)
18If Γτ ⊂ N (η2), then Γτ \N (η2) = ∅, and ξτ = 0. In this case, γ0 ∈ N (η2). Therefore, V1
¡
γ0
¢
=
(1− c) / (1− δ), and it follows directly that V1 ≥ V n1 .
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DeÞne An = N (ηn2 ) \N (η2), and let
TAn (ω) =
©
t ≥ 0 | γt (ω) ∈ Anª (83)
be the Þrst entry time into An. Notice, that An ⊆ N ¡ηnτ2 ¢ \N (η2) for all n > nτ . This implies
that
P [TAn ≤ τ ] = 0 for all n > nτ (84)
since, by construction, no state can reach N
¡
ηn
τ
2
¢ \N (η2) before time τ . As an illustration,
consider the following picture.
We shall now write U1 in terms of the Þrst entry time. Let n > nτ , and deÞne ηn,t = ηn (γt),
then
U1 (η
n
1 , η
n
2 ) =
Z
{TAn<∞}
TAn−1X
t=0
δt
£
π
¡
ηn,t1 , η
n,t
2
¢− cηn,t1 ¤ (85)
+ δTAnU1 (η
n
1 , η
n
2 )
¡
γTAn
¢
dP (ω; ηn1 , η
n
2 , γ) (86)
+
Z
{TAn=∞}
∞X
t=0
δt
£
π
¡
ηn,t1 , η
n,t
2
¢− cηn,t1 ¤ dP (ω; ηn1 , ηn2 , γ) . (87)
Now, because of Proposition 8 (i), the proÞles (ηn1 , η
n
2 ) and (η
n
1 , η2) coincide on {TAn =∞} and
as long as An is not reached. Hence, they give rise to the same transition probabilities and
payoﬀs on {TAn =∞} and as long as An is not reached. Therefore, the second integral and the
sum in the Þrst integral coincide under (ηn1 , η
n
2 ) and (η
n
1 , η2). Accordingly
U1 (η
n
1 , η
n
2 )− U1 (η1, ηn2 ) (88)
=
Z
{TAn<∞}
δTAnU1 (η
n
1 , η
n
2 )
¡
γTAn
¢
dP (ω; ηn1 , η
n
2 , γ) (89)
−
Z
{TAn<∞}
δTAnU1 (η1, η
n
2 )
¡
γTAn
¢
dP (ω; η1, η
n
2 , γ) (90)
Moreover, the process stops under (ηn1 , η
n
2 ) when A
n is reached since player 2 then stops exerting
eﬀort. Player 1 either exerts eﬀort, if γTAn ∈ N (ηn1 ) ∩ An. Or, if γTAn /∈ N (ηn1 ) ∩ An, he does
not exert eﬀort. In either case he obtains utility
U1 (η
n
1 , η
n
2 )
¡
γTAn
¢ ≤ 1− c
1− δ . (91)
30
Furthermore, by deÞnition of a best response, U1 (η1, ηn2 ) ≤ U1 (ηn1 , ηn2 ). Hence,
|U1 (ηn1 , ηn2 )− U1 (η1, ηn2 )| = U1 (ηn1 , ηn2 )− U1 (η1, ηn2 ) (92)
≤
Z
{TAn<∞}
δTAn
1− c
1− δ dP (ω; η
n
1 , η
n
2 , γ)− 0 (93)
≤ P [TAn ≤ τ ] 1− c
1− δ (94)
+
Z
{τ<TAn<∞}
δTAn
1− c
1− δ dP
≤ 0 + δτ 1− c
1− δ (95)
< ε. (96)
This shows the claim. ¤
Proof of Theorem 1: Equilibrium: By Propositions 9 and 10 it follows that η∗1 = lim η
n
1 =
limBR1 (η
n
2 ) = BR1 (lim η
n
2 ) = BR1 (η
∗
2). Likewise, η
∗
2 = BR2 (η
∗
1). Thus, (η
∗
1, η
∗
2) is an equilib-
rium.
Ad (i): To prove the claim, we show that player 1s utility from choosing e1 = 1 against η∗2 in
state (0, 1) is strictly negative. Then, continuity of U1 implies that there is a neighbourhood
around (0, 1) such that e1 = 1 gives strictly negative utility in this neighbourhood. Therefore,
in this neighbourhood V1 = 0, and η∗1 = 0.
Notice Þrst that in state γ = (0, 1), the state is not updated any more. Thus, it is op-
timal for player 2 to choose e2 = 1, irrespective of what player 1 does. Indeed, if player 1
chooses e1 = 0, then player 2 gets (1− c) / (1− δ) from choosing e2 = 1, and from choosing
e2 = 0 he gets 1/ (2 (1− δ)) < (1− c) / (1− δ). If player 1 chooses e1 = 1, then player
2 gets (1/2 +∆α− c) / (1− δ) from choosing e2 = 1, and from choosing e2 = 0 he gets
0 < (1/2 +∆α− c) / (1− δ). Hence, η∗2 (0, 1) = 1. Likewise, η∗1 (1, 0) = 1.
Suppose now that player 1 chooses e1 = 1 against η∗2 in state (0, 1). Then player 1 gets
(1/2 +∆α− c) / (1− δ) < 0. But this is what we wanted to show.
Ad (ii): This is an immediate consequence of Proposition 8 (ii). ¤
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